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1. Introduction 
This article explores how strategic communication, 
public diplomacy, international governmental broad-
casting, and social media networking can be brought 
together in a system of strategic influence and global 
engagement. The analysis offers an approach to public 
diplomacy and strategic communication which con-
trasts with other approaches that privilege one form of 
governmental influence over others. Some of those 
approaches treat partial aspects of national persuasion 
as complete pictures of government communication 
aimed at foreign audiences. A major problem with both 
the study of and the implementation of government 
communication such as international broadcasting is 
the recurring disagreements about terminology and 
which governmental entities should conduct specific 
forms of influence such as public affairs and infor-
mation operations. A related problem is that new me-
dia today as well as old media like radio and TV, are no 
longer isolated channels of communication, but are 
part of media systems or ecologies. Because so much 
of public diplomacy literature today emphasizes social 
media, it is necessary to determine how specific tools 
of influence such as international broadcasting, can be 
used in ways that fit the new thinking in public diplo-
macy and strategic communication in all areas of 
communication directed to other nations (national in-
fluence) from the United States Government (USG). 
Thus, the main problem we address here is the frag-
mented nature of USG influence and the lack of theory 
guiding present proposals for solving the problem.  
We begin by examining the history of American na-
tional influence and the emergence of public diploma-
cy and strategic communication. We then note how 
power, influence, and national interests are all at stake, 
as both public diplomacy and strategic communication 
serve them. We then move to the role of international 
broadcasting and its possible turn away from a propa-
ganda function, toward a relational one. This includes 
noting the need for international broadcasting to inte-
grate mass communication with social media and digi-
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tal communication. Following that, we use Rhonda 
Zaharna’s arguments about network diplomacy and 
collaborative public diplomacy, along with Manuel Cas-
tells’ communication power theory, to build a model of 
strategic influence and global engagement that can 
guide international broadcasting into some new func-
tions. The study concludes with an argument about how 
the model can be used to focus research and debates 
about ways that international broadcasting can serve 
both strategic influence and global engagement goals.  
Strategic communication (SC) is generally concep-
tualized as communication done by the USG for pur-
poses of enhancing national image and improving rela-
tions with other nations. The term, as applied to political 
communication, originated with the Department of De-
fense in 2004.1 Public diplomacy (PD) is a kind of strate-
gic communication in some views and an alternative to 
SC in others. The PD term originated in academia and is 
carried heavily by the State Department (Cull, 2009). 
Both of these terms refer to national political influence 
directed toward other nations. Overall, there are two 
camps of national influence that appear to be talking 
past each other—strategic influence done by military 
and intelligence sources, and relational networking for 
public diplomacy. According to Gregory (2014), public 
diplomacy is defined as nation-states and other politi-
cal entities analyzing cultures, attitudes, and behaviors; 
constructing and managing relationships; and doing 
persuasion that promotes their interests. 
Four terms are defined here for the clarity of the 
argument to be developed. SC generally refers to ei-
ther all government persuasion aimed at other nations 
or populations or to the governmental persuasion 
more likely done by the military than by the diplomacy 
community. PD refers to persuasion aimed at other na-
tions or populations that is more likely to be done by 
the diplomacy community than by the military. Strate-
gic influence refers to governmental or national com-
munication done by any agency or agencies of the gov-
ernment that is designed to change attitudes of other 
populations. Information operations (IO), while some-
time defined as military kinetic information assurance 
and attack only, actually includes persuasion work such 
as counter-propaganda (Armistead, 2010).2 Despite pa-
rochial efforts to keep these separate, recurring con-
ceptual intersections make clean separations impossi-
ble. This is because the history of American national 
influence efforts has always involved both strategic in-
fluence and cultural engagement, even if new labels 
have been attached to the same wine bottles. As we 
move toward a discussion about international broad-
casting, it is assumed here that both social media and 
                                                          
1 http://fas.org:8080/irp/agency/dod/dsb/commun.pdf 
2 IO is sometimes incorrectly denoted as an activity or domain 
limited to military operations, when in fact, IO is also practiced 
by the intelligence community (IC).  
international broadcasting have specific purposes for 
political influence and cultural networking.  
Soft power is a concept used by scholars to discuss 
influence which is based on attraction and persuasion 
as opposed to influence based on coercion or force 
(hard power). While hard power can work to stop vio-
lent actions at times, soft power can work to build rela-
tionships and cultural affinities (Nye, 2004). Smart 
power is used to define uses of both soft power and 
hard power in relation to contextual factors. As the us-
es of smart power can be viewed as a system of influ-
ence using both hard and soft power as needed, a sys-
tem of smart diplomacy (with appropriate firewalls) 
can combine soft diplomacy and hard diplomacy. Con-
sistent with the soft power concept, soft diplomacy is 
intended to be non-aggressive and focused on relation-
ships and conciliatory communication. On the other 
hand, hard diplomacy, like hard power, is intended to 
be aggressive and one-sided with its messages. Hard 
diplomacy can be used in conjunction with force 
against violent agents. Examples of hard diplomacy are 
coercive diplomacy, information operations, counter-
ideology/narrative, and refutation broadcasting. Soft 
diplomacy includes cultural diplomacy, network diplo-
macy, exchanges, public affairs, and objective broad-
casting. It can be used to build soft power attraction 
and positive national images in conjunction with tradi-
tional diplomacy. It may be possible to locate public af-
fairs, cultural networking, exchanges, and some broad-
casting and social media networking within the goals of 
what is now accepted as public diplomacy. Hard diplo-
macy is likely to involve communication that pressures 
others into compliance. In contrast, soft diplomacy can 
be seen in relationship building and cultural exchanges. 
The concept of soft diplomacy is consistent with the 
goals of soft power. The concept of smart diplomacy 
offers an alternative to choosing between either a soft 
diplomacy (relational) or a hard diplomacy (informa-
tional) for situations requiring a mix of both approach-
es to influence. Smart diplomacy is defined here as di-
plomacy that uses either hard or soft diplomacy for 
varying persuasive needs. Clearly, Nye’s (2004) concept 
of smart power provides an analogue for the concept 
of smart diplomacy offered here.  
Global engagement is defined here as two-way dia-
logue between the USG and other nations or popula-
tions, along with more deliberation and debate as op-
posed to more push-down and one-sided persuasive 
messages (Snyder, 2013). The Obama administration’s 
approach to global engagement has stressed working 
with other nations to address shared global issues as 
well as engage foreign audiences to understand Ameri-
can national interests (Lord & Lynch, 2010). The White 
House approach to global engagement includes negoti-
ation, dialogue, public diplomacy, and cultural net-
working. The White House (2010) states “Our commu-
nication and engagement with foreign audiences 
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should emphasize mutual respect and interest. The 
United States should articulate a positive vision…and 
engage foreign audiences on positive terms” (p. 6). 
Mutual respect and interests should avoid the prob-
lems that Arndt (2005) notes with cultural communica-
tion that treats America as the teacher and other cul-
tures as learners.  
In building a model of strategic influence and global 
engagement, we argue that models of mass communi-
cation and message diffusion are weak in their ability 
to explain how international broadcasting and new 
media can be used for public diplomacy. These models 
form the foundation of many current arguments about 
PD and SC. We prefer to employ network theories, spe-
cifically, Zaharna’s model of network diplomacy and 
Castells’ theory of communication power. These per-
spectives provide a sound basis for developing theoret-
ical propositions regarding the role of social media 
used in conjunction with broadcasting channels like 
Voice of America (VOA). A perspective that unifies stra-
tegic communication and public diplomacy as well as 
mass communication, international broadcasting, and 
networking communication is presented as a model of 
strategic influence and global engagement. Scholars 
have recently noted that “Despite the proliferation of 
contemporary international broadcasting, research 
about it lacks theoretical development” (Youmans & 
Powers, 2012, p. 2149). While no single model can be 
expected to unify everything important about either 
public diplomacy or international broadcasting, im-
portant progress can be made by offering new models 
for testing, debate, and heuristic value.  
Strategic influence, as used in this article, refers to 
a combination of strong public diplomacy and strategic 
communication. It is designed to not only inform, but 
also to change attitudes (Waller, 2009). Sometimes, 
this means aggressive communication that counters 
the communication of other nations or organizations 
(Waller, 2009). Changing attitudes, commonly known 
as persuasion, is not seen here as inimical to cultural 
relations or cultural engagement. Both are parts of a 
larger system of national influence. National influence 
is by nature political and serves the national interests 
and national security concerns of the source nation.  
The argument presented here brings together what 
some scholars in the past separated—strategic com-
munication being done by the military and public di-
plomacy being done by the State Department.3 A 
recognition of the fact that the Department of Defense 
(DOD) can do public diplomacy and the Department of 
State (DOS) can do strategic communication, shows 
that this dichotomy has lost its usefulness. Strategic 
                                                          
3 We recognize the fact that some scholars use SC as an um-
brella term for all USG influence (Waller, 2009). We find it 
more useful to view SC and PD as two forms of national influ-
ence.  
communication has been used by some experts as an 
umbrella term that indicates a “whole of government” 
approach to “unified” or “integrated” communication 
sent to other populations by the USG. Strategic com-
munication and its public diplomacy are designed to 
achieve the following national security objectives of 
the USG: championing human dignity; strengthening al-
liances against terrorism; defusing regional conflicts; 
preventing threats from weapons of mass destruction; 
encouraging global economic growth; and transforming 
America’s national security institutions to meet the 
challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first centu-
ry. It has become evident that when the U.S. military 
becomes more involved in civilian affairs, the SC ver-
sions of PD predominate more than in areas of conflict 
than where the military is less involved.4 
SC and PD stem directly from national security poli-
cies. Before terms like SC and PD were used by the 
USG, it was common to talk about the government 
providing information, conducting ideological warfare, 
doing political warfare, and designing campaigns to 
“win hearts and minds.”  SC, PD, and IO shared the goal 
of winning battles not only with military force but with 
so-called “soft power” or non-military means of per-
suasion and influence. Because these forms of com-
munication work in parallel, one might see IO as the 
hard side of soft power, as noted by some IO scholars 
(Armistead, 2010). One key issue regarding SC today is 
how much the component disciplines and areas of re-
sponsibility should be coordinated or integrated. Coor-
dination does not have to include integration but an in-
tegrated approach to national influence can assure that 
all the various forms of USG communication aimed at 
other populations are congruent in goals, values, 
themes, and message strategies.  
There is a dual nature of SC and PD that is im-
portant to recognize. The twin goals of national influ-
ence are a) to promote a better national image and re-
lationships with others, and b) to counter false or 
negative information coming from other political 
sources. A current example is Japanese national influ-
ence. Most of what Japan does with public diplomacy 
has the objective of building soft power, or specifically, 
of employing cultural diplomacy to foster better inter-
national relations. One tool employed by Japan to do 
this is the Japan Foundation. Yet, there is also the ac-
companying goal of offering an alternative to another 
nation’s soft power outlets, those of China which are 
known as the Confucius Institutes (Snow, 2014). The 
USG has many outlets of international broadcasting 
                                                          
4 It is important to note that some of legal strictures on State 
Department PD do not apply to Department of Defense or mili-
tary broadcasting. For example, armed forces broadcasting, in-
tended for internal American audiences, is overseen by the 
DOD, not the BBG. http://afrts.dodmedia.osd.mil/facts/2. 
pdf?v=1 
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that clearly serve the constant goals just described. For 
instance, after 9/11, broadcasting was intended to win 
hearts and minds of those who might be susceptible to 
anti-American messages (Snow, 2014).  
International broadcasting sources like the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Japan’s NHK World, 
Deutsche Welle, and the Voice of America (VOA), are 
careful to keep perceptions of credibility high while al-
so being diligent in not contributing to any endanger-
ment of national security. Because they are arms of 
governmental policy and communication offices, these 
broadcasting sources need both objectivity and service 
to foreign policy goals of their respective states. Some-
times, as in the case of USG sources like Al Hurra in the 
Middle East, the central goal of USG broadcasting is to 
counter the anti-American broadcasting of other na-
tions or groups in the region (Snow, 2014). In a way, in-
ternational broadcasting is held to the standard of ob-
jectivity while also being expected to present American 
interests in the best light and countering anti-American 
messages. This is akin to what is continuously expected 
of both SC and PD. 
America’s VOA outlet, often compared to the BBC 
for its objectivity, has become embroiled in the ten-
sions between objectivity and state support we have 
been discussing. In 2001, the VOA had interviews with 
violent extremists. The network did this to fulfill its 
goals of balance, objectivity, and credibility, but critics 
argued that in times of national crises, international 
broadcasting should help the nation advocate more 
than strive to be balanced. In the words of one of these 
critics, William Safire (2001), “Even in peacetime, news 
credibility does not flow from splitting the moral dif-
ference between good and evil” (para. 14). The State 
Department apparently pressured the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors (BBG) to have the VOA back off 
from interviewing Mullah Mohammed Omar, a key Tal-
iban leader.  
The strategic goals of the BBG today are stated as 
providing accurate and objective news, but also as tell-
ing America’s story to the world (Price, Has, & Margo-
lin, 2008). The BBG says that it “supports United States 
national interests through its mission to inform, en-
gage, and connect people around the world in support 
of freedom and democracy” (BBG, 2013, p. 1). The BBG 
(2015) claims a weekly audience of approximately 215 
million people. BBG broadcasting services include Voice 
of America (VOA), Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/FRL), Radio Free 
Asia (RFA), and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks 
(MBN).5 The BBG is distributing programs in 61 lan-
guages to more than 100 countries each week (BBG, 
2015). This includes the old media of radio and TV, as 
well as the new media, including mobile phones and 
                                                          
5 http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2015/03/BBG_Fact 
sheet_v18.pdf 
social media. The BBG is independent but is still a fed-
eral agency that supervises all government civilian-run 
international media (Mull & Wallin, 2013). All interna-
tional broadcasting networks are concerned with na-
tional security and are not just sources of news. Inter-
national broadcasting networks are also a source of 
strategic influence, however subtle or blatant. 6  This 
function is consistent with the clear guidelines for the 
BBG and its international broadcasting that are set out 
in legislation and policies. American international 
broadcasting is required to provide all sides of im-
portant issues and USG policies, to provide opportunity 
for debates about the policies, while also advancing 
USG foreign policy by informing foreign audiences “in a 
balanced and objective manner” (Weed, 2014, p. 17). 
Connecting international broadcasting to foreign policy 
involves an examination of national security concerns 
that guide the formation of government policies.  
2. The National Security Context for Strategic 
Influence  
National security policies must precede strategic com-
munication and public diplomacy policies if the latter 
are to serve national security interests and goals. The 
central goal of American national security is to ensure 
the physical safety of the nation and protecting its na-
tional interests. The term “national security” became 
increasingly common in political discourse after World 
War II. It is a concern for presidents and statecraft that 
involves not only military matters, but also security in 
diplomacy, economics, and national identity (Mastape-
ter, 2008). An essential part of national security is na-
tional power and such power can be viewed as eco-
nomic, technological, military, diplomatic, and 
relational. American national security communication 
has always included discourse that promotes its values 
and projects it power. While the forms of USG commu-
nication are reinvented, re-conceptualized, and re-
organized frequently, the underlying mission of bol-
stering national security remains constant.  
As threats to national security constitute a spec-
trum of threats ranging from conflict to extreme vio-
lence and war, strategies for dealing with these threats 
also have a spectrum ranging from diplomacy and ne-
gotiation to all-out war. An implication here may be 
that choices made by the USG about power options 
might lead to choices made about what types of SC and 
PD are optimal for particular circumstances. For exam-
ple, recent Presidents (Bush and Obama in particular) 
have chosen approaches to national power that project 
American power and dominance in certain regions so 
that SC and PD are guarding the national security ob-
                                                          
6 This should not imply that influence equates with propagan-
da. Refuting falsehood can be done with facts and truthful clar-
ification of policies (Arndt, 2005).  
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jectives and political interests of the White House.  
Some observers note that because national influ-
ence (SC, PD) is born in considerations of power and 
political interests of a source nation, it is necessary to 
have influence that does not shy away from or deny 
political strategies (Lord & Lynch, 2010). Whether Thu-
cydides giving an account of the Peloponnesian War, 
Julian Corbett distinguishing German military strategies 
from British ones, or contemporary Israel contemplat-
ing aggressive actions by other Middle Eastern states, 
political and military theorists have seen the connec-
tions between history, geography, cultural, and nation-
nation interactions (Mahnken, 2006). The fact that the 
United States is the most powerful state on the planet 
affects how it relates to other nations and how it con-
ducts national influence. Strategic culture is a nation-
state’s set of shared beliefs and modes of behavior that 
shape its collective identity and method for securing 
national security (Mahnken, 2006). For example, Amer-
ican strategic culture is imbued with exceptionalism 
(Mahnken, 2006). This affects how the nation com-
municates.  
Along with the study of strategic cultures as back-
ground knowledge for effective SC and PD, it is neces-
sary to consider complex interdependencies in how na-
tions and cultures relate to each other (Freedman, 
2013). This includes the study of culture, but also poli-
tics, technologies, economics, geography, and intelli-
gence (Gray, 1999). Strategic and systems thinking 
should accompany SC and PD planning and evaluation, 
yet there is scant evidence of this now occurring or be-
ing recommended in the myriad of reports on national 
influence. Systems thinking looks at multiple variables 
relevant to a problem and how changes in those varia-
bles affect each other and the entire system (Freed-
man, 2013).  
In addition to the need for basing national influence 
on political strategies that serve national interests and 
national security, there is a need for historical realism 
in narrating the position of the United States in world 
opinion. It is presently too common to cite the decline 
of America’s national image in the recent past, free of 
any long-term historical perspective. For example, his-
torians have noted that criticisms of Americans by Eu-
ropeans go back to the colonial days. We know for ex-
ample that while Alexis de Tocqueville praised certain 
aspects of American life, he was also very critical of 
other aspects such as what he called the “tyranny of 
the majority.” The founding fathers of America like 
Thomas Jefferson portrayed the new nation as a “cho-
sen country” (Sanders, 2011, p. 15). In the 19th centu-
ry, English, German, Russian, and French authors were 
mocking Americans as being vulgar and focused mainly 
on making money (Sanders, 2011). This kind of histori-
cal context is important for understanding why SC and 
PD professionals struggle so much with how to improve 
America’s image in the world. Critical views of the 
United States did not originate with 9/11 or the inva-
sion of Iraq despite the fact that recent operations 
have increased negative attitudes toward the nation.  
3. The Need for Strategic Influence 
Some observers like Admiral Mike Mullen appear to 
believe that good policies automatically generate good 
relations among nations, thereby erasing the need to 
keep struggling over meanings and strategies for SC.  
Mullen (2009) argued: “To put it simply, we need to 
worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions 
and much more about what our actions communicate. 
Each time we fail to live up to our values or don’t fol-
low up on a promise, we look more and more like the 
arrogant Americans the enemy claims we are” (p.4). 
Such thinking can lead to strong criticism of systematic 
government influence. Some reject or resist strong sys-
tematic influence because they believe that it has so of-
ten failed in the past. A continual challenge to strategic 
influence has been the steady flow of criticisms from 
other nations, even allies, of American presence in other 
places in the world. It appears that dodging serious dis-
cussion about policy concerns with traditional public re-
lations techniques can add fire to the accusations of bad 
policies and bad intentions (Sanders, 2011).  
We noted earlier, there are competing definitions 
for most terms related to national influence. For ex-
ample, Snow (2014) observes “There is no one defini-
tion of public diplomacy in the literature….Educational 
and cultural exchange have been a public diplomacy 
mainstay, as is an international broadcasting operation 
that targets a global population” (p. 4). It is possible 
that some of the confusion about terminology in SC 
and PD is related to a weak sense of historical progres-
sion for how Americans respond to national identity, 
compete with other ideologies and have a reluctance 
to have strong propaganda in times of peace. Thus, we 
now look at some historical background.  
4. Historical Background  
Throughout history, nations have used communication 
to promote their interests and to warn adversaries 
about their commitment to their national security. Co-
lonial Americans, in their struggle for independence 
from England, used personal diplomacy, letters, intelli-
gence, pamphlets, and the Declaration of Independ-
ence, to cajole potential supporters in France, Spain, 
Canada, and other nations to support their cause (Wal-
ler, 2008). France promoted its revolution in the 18th 
century by sending messages directly to citizens of 
other nations. Like the Alliance Francaise origins in 
1883, other nations such as Italy and Germany, estab-
lished institutes for promoting their cultures. America 
was generally reluctant to establish a permanent and 
large-scale ideological agency. Despite its early com-
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mitment to cultural diplomacy, the United States is 
wary of establishing large-scale ideological agencies.  
World War I brought the emergence of the Com-
mittee on Public Information (CPI). The CPI was the 
first centralized propaganda agency of the USG. In 
1917, President Woodrow Wilson appointed George 
Creel, a journalist and campaign consultant for Wood-
row Wilson’s re-election campaign of 1916, to be the 
director of the CPI. Creel targeted both foreigners and 
Americans to support the war. Wilson and Creel 
worked closely together to frame the U.S. entry into 
the war as idealistic and imperative. Creel framed 
those opposed to the war as traitors. Creel knew that 
what he called information was propaganda, but he ar-
gued that even information presents what the govern-
ment wants people to believe. The CPI portrayals were 
to be based on facts and the public should make the de-
sired conclusions and decisions by examining the evi-
dence presented to them. Creel used the word “infor-
mation” rather than “propaganda” because he believed 
the latter was “purposeful lying” (Arndt, 2005, p. 28). It 
is interesting that Creel once remarked that “people do 
not live by bread alone; they live mostly by catch 
phrases” (Freedman, 2013, p. 337). The first official 
propaganda agency for America was steeped in strate-
gies and tactics of one-way framing and persuasion.  
America shut down its CPI propaganda machine in 
1919 (Tuch, 1990). During the post-war years, Hitler 
ramped up Germany’s propaganda, in part, by learning 
from CPI tactics (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991). Russian 
Bolsheviks made propaganda a major part of their for-
eign policy strategies. The British BBC was established 
in 1922. The Dutch began their international broad-
casting in 1927, the French in 1931, and the British in 
1932. The fascists in Italy and Germany had unified 
ideological operations up and running ahead of the 
United States. The Office of War Information (OWI) 
was started by President Roosevelt in 1941 and the 
VOA began in 1942 (Sorenson, 2006). The OWI was 
created to help define the role of the United States in 
the world. Russia had already made Radio Moscow an 
international broadcasting network by the beginning of 
World War II (Dizard, 2004). Nazi Germany had devel-
oped a strong radio propaganda system and Britain had 
its British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) which began 
broadcasting international radio programs in 1932 
(Dizard, 2004).  
Before World War II, the United States was the only 
major power that did not have a strategic influence or 
public diplomacy bureaucracy. In 1938, the State De-
partment established a Division of Cultural Relations 
and programs targeted at the people in Latin America. 
In 1940, Nelson Rockefeller became the leader of the 
newly created Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs. Some political leaders thought that 
truth was more important than propaganda. There 
were leaders in the military who believed that wars are 
fought with weapons and not with words. This changed 
with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1942. Ideo-
logical operations became part of war mobilization. 
While President Roosevelt had witnessed the actions of 
the CPI during World I and despised that kind of cen-
tralized and iron-fisted propaganda, Nelson Rockefeller 
did not mind blending cultural relations with propa-
ganda and intelligence (Arndt, 2005). Propaganda was 
enjoined with soft-power culturalism.  
All of the nations that fought in World War II used 
strong propaganda as part of their means of doing bat-
tle (Taylor, 2003). British propaganda against the Nazis 
used some of the same themes used in World War I, 
such as the Nazis being ruthless and hateful “Huns.” 
While President Roosevelt had officially opposed prop-
aganda, he came to endorse the use of Hollywood 
movies to support America’s war against the Axis pow-
ers. Roosevelt commented “The motion picture indus-
try could be the most powerful instrument of propa-
ganda in the world, whether it tries to be or not” 
(Taylor, 2003, p. 229). Both Winston Churchill and 
Franklin Roosevelt spoke to their respective popula-
tions with popular fireside radio “chats.” These radio 
speeches were designed to fortify domestic confidence 
in the war efforts.  
The end of World War II brought declining interest 
in ideological warfare, but it increased again with the 
emergence of the Cold War. Advocates of strong public 
diplomacy during the Second World War included Nel-
son Rockefeller and William Donovan, both of whom 
saw strong strategic influence as necessary to combat 
the propaganda of the Germans (Arndt, 2005). Both 
men were outspoken leaders who advocated stronger 
reactions by the United States to the Nazi regime of 
Germany. Donovan worked on establishing the espio-
nage service that later became the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and a project to use propaganda to sup-
port British resistance to the Germans. Rockefeller lob-
bied for greater American efforts in Latin America in 
order to counter German influence there. His efforts 
led to radio broadcasts directed into Latin America. 
President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Donovan as 
head of the Office of the Coordinator of Information 
(COI). The COI collected intelligence but also conducted 
information operations designed to diminish the mo-
rale of the Germans. The COI included a unit known as 
the Foreign Information Service (FIS). The FIS was an 
effort of William Donovan and President Roosevelt to 
expand ideological operations far beyond the influence 
campaign directed into Latin America. In 1942, the FIS 
initiated radio broadcasts with the name Voice of 
America. According to Nicholas Cull (2009), the intelli-
gence community (IC) developed the early radio capa-
bilities for the U.S. such as VOA.  
While many people questioned the need or desira-
bility of propaganda for a domestic audience, others 
also questioned the idea of propaganda for other na-
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tions during times of peace. Ralph Block (1948), a State 
Department official at the time wrote that “It is possi-
ble that more Americans approve of the use of the 
atomic bomb in defensive warfare than approve of the 
use of propaganda to forestall war” (p. 678). The White 
House shut down the OWI in less than two weeks after 
the surrender of Japan. President Truman transferred 
the functions of the OWI to the State Department, 
where it became part of the Bureau of Public Affairs. 
The functions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
were transferred to the War Department, including 
overt psychological operations. One thing to note in 
this brief historical foray is the tendency of the USG to 
back off from aggressive communication during peace-
time and to have disagreements about how and where 
to locate and manage national influence activities.  
Three key cultural tools for Germany’s propaganda 
chief Josef Goebbels, were radio, news print, and film. 
Radios were taken over by the Nazis who viewed prop-
aganda as fighting on a new kind of battlefield. The Na-
zis combined public relations in other nations with 
their propaganda efforts. There were 300 German-
language newspapers in other countries. They had fi-
nancial holdings in 350 newspapers published in other 
languages. They also had a news service called Trans-
ocean that mixed objective news with propaganda 
such as anti-British messages. Goebbels hired a pioneer 
Ivy Lee of the American public relations industry to 
help him with his propaganda. Ivy Lee helped to do im-
age repair for John D. Rockefeller (Hart, 2013). Ivy Lee 
had worked with the CPI during World War I. Lee was 
paid $33,000 per year to help make Hitler popular 
among the German people (Manvell & Fraenkel, 2010).  
There was no commitment to truth in Nazi propa-
ganda, just as there is no commitment to truth in pro-
terrorist propaganda today. President Roosevelt was 
accused of serving the Jews. The sinking of the British 
passenger ship, the S.S. Athenia, was said to have been 
done not by the Germans (they really did it) but by Brit-
ish leader Winston Churchill. Goebbels was controlling 
German radio broadcasting by 1933. Listening to radio 
broadcasts critical of Germany could result in impris-
onment. By 1942, Nazi radio broadcasting was reaching 
out in nearly 30 languages. German Nazi broadcasting 
even reached America. The point here is that much of 
what Nazi Germany accomplished in gaining power was 
related to their propaganda and their propaganda took 
full advantage of broadcasting. Goebbels noted in his 
diaries that he was able to use propaganda to build the 
Hitler Fuhrer mythology (Manvell & Fraenkel, 2010). 
The Nazis believed that people can be convinced of 
truths best when the messages are very simple and 
highly repeated. It took some time for the USG to real-
ize how effective German propaganda was with both 
internal (domestic) and external audiences. Hitler him-
self believed that one major reason for Germany losing 
World War I was the effectiveness of American propa-
ganda. Seven organizations were used by the USG to 
fight Nazi propaganda and to use communication to 
help the war against Germany and its fascist allies. Psy-
chological warfare, information services, and propagan-
da were all used to combat Nazi claims and credibility, as 
well as to degrade the morale of those who supported 
Hitler. The three most important organizations were the 
OWI, the OSS and the Army. The latter two were heavily 
involved in covert communication projects.  
The aggressive propaganda/PD of the Soviet Union 
and its leader Josef Stalin, convinced American leaders 
that their nation needed a strong voice against the 
messages of the Soviets. While the National Security 
Act of 1947 created the DOD and the CIA, it did not 
create a central information office like the CPI or the 
OWI. However, the CIA was given authority to conduct 
covert psychological operations to counteract the ac-
tions of the Soviets. In 1948, the Smith-Mundt Act gave 
legal authority for overt information campaigns. The 
law called for official dissemination of information 
about America, its population, and its policies. One of 
the stated goals of this law was to enhance under-
standing among nations (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005). The 
VOA was run from within the State Department at this 
time. All of this was done to support U.S. foreign policy 
which included the Truman Doctrine, and the expan-
sion of American influence.  
Like the CPI of World War I and the OWI in World 
War II, the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
was established to persuade people in other nations 
that the United States national interests and national 
security policies should be supported. The USIA was es-
tablished in 1953 and was terminated in 1999, when its 
functions were returned to the DOS. Since 1999, PD 
and United States SC have been loosely coordinated 
and subject to competing paradigms and definitions of 
terms. Still, the history above shows that the United 
States needs strategic influence and counter-
communication at the same time that it favors building 
cultural relations through various forms of diplomacy. 
There are few options when so many communication 
spheres of influence include messages attacking the 
U.S. and its policies.  
5. International Broadcasting and Public Diplomacy  
Writing in 1937, Silas Bent noted that messages sent to 
other nations from the United States and messages 
sent to America from other nations are both national-
istic and conducive “of better international under-
standing” (p. 117). He also referred to radio music pro-
grams furthering good will. Additionally, he observed 
that sport coverage of events like the English Derby 
and the Davis Cup finals “help to give to the world a 
sense of common possession, if not of solidarity” (Bent, 
1937, p. 119). It appears that international broadcast-
ing would be a preferred tool of publicity for both fas-
 Media and Communication, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 69-91 76 
cists like Hitler and Stalin and anti-fascists like Franklin 
Roosevelt. Ideological operations became part of war 
mobilization. The first major technology used was the 
one used by America’s allies and enemies. This was radio 
and it became the main tool of the Voice of America. 
The VOA started on February 24, 1942 and its first words 
were “We shall speak to you about America and the 
war—the news may be good or bad—we shall tell you 
the truth” (Snow, 2014, p. 8). The end of World War II 
brought declining interest in ideological warfare, but it 
increased again with the emergence of the Cold War. 
Before the formation of the USIA, information and 
ideological operations, both overt and covert, were 
conducted by the military and the DOS. The latter’s 
Policy Planning Staff established efforts to roll back ag-
gression by the Soviets in Eastern Europe (Dizard, 
2004). The CIA, which was the successor to the OSS, 
secretly ran Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Radio 
Free Europe was on the air in 1951 (Kennedy & Lucas, 
2005). The content of these radio stations was con-
sistent with the DOS Policy Planning Staff goals for chal-
lenging the Soviets. At the time of the USIA formation, 
public diplomacy and information operations were influ-
enced or conducted by the National Security Council, the 
CIA, the DOS, the DOD, and the White House.  
The impetus for creating the USIA was closely relat-
ed to USG objectives in the Cold War. The goals of the 
agency were to explain the policies of the United 
States, counter adversary propaganda, and to help 
others understand American culture (Arndt, 2005). Cul-
tural affairs officers, who believed that the State De-
partment had started with the right focus on cultural 
diplomacy in 1938, were disappointed with these goals. 
They believed that the USIA did not concentrate 
enough on mutual understanding of other populations 
along with various types of partnerships (Arndt, 2005).  
The 1999 demise of the USIA meant that public di-
plomacy would be steered officially by the DOS. Two 
components of the USIA, International Information 
Programs and the Educational and Cultural Affairs bu-
reau, were now to be run by the undersecretary for 
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (Lord, 2006). A 
third part of the USIA, the Office of Media Research 
and Analysis became part of the State Department’s In-
telligence and Research Bureau (Lord, 2006). 
American leaders have supported large-scale ideo-
logical operations in times of war such as the two 
world wars and the Cold War. After the Cold War and 
collapse of the USSR, it was assumed that the USIA was 
less necessary. Since then, however, the Cold War has 
been replaced by the present war on insurgencies and 
terrorists. While there was support for centralized PD 
during the two world wars and the Cold War, some ob-
servers note that the USG was behind our allies in the 
commitment to ideological operations (Doorey, 2009). 
During the Cold War, the VOA, which existed before 
and after the USIA, reached about 80% if the Eastern 
European populations. In recent times, without the 
USIA, the VOA has reached only a small percentage of 
people in the Middle East (Doorey, 2009). Official VOA 
figures indicate that the VOA reaches 80% of the total 
American international media audience.7 From Wash-
ington, D.C., the VOA produces more than 70 TV shows 
and 200 radio programs. VOA services include websites 
and social media sites.  
While there are tensions between SC, PD, and ideo-
logical operations between one side of America’s in-
ternational influence and cultural diplomacy and part-
nerships on the other side, history shows the division is 
not necessary. Hard power and soft power sometimes 
work together while soft power can work on its own or 
in tandem with hard power (Nye, 2004). Cultural di-
plomacy is preferable to IO but is longer-term and does 
not address rapid-attack communication from adver-
saries. The USIA was able to combine soft and hard 
communication and its effectiveness in the Cold War 
still presents a model, albeit not without problems, for 
a unified approach to USG international influence. Un-
like the CPI, the USIA was not viewed negatively by the 
public or Congress in any major sense. Its demise ap-
pears to be more related to the USG wanting a more 
active role for the DOS in PD and some politicians seek-
ing to cut budget costs during another period of peace 
(Arndt, 2005; Dizard, 2004). The agency had successful-
ly countered Soviet propaganda during the Cold War 
with VOA, Radio Marti, and Radio Liberty. It also con-
tinued cultural diplomacy such as like cultural ex-
changes and scholarships (Paul, 2011).  
6. Controversies Regarding International Broadcasting  
While the international broadcasting component of na-
tional influence began with radio, it has extended from 
radio into television, the Internet, and social media to-
day. Historically, international broadcasting has been 
defined as state-sponsored news, information, and en-
tertainment directed to the populations of other na-
tions (Price et al., 2008). It was once unabashedly asso-
ciated with necessary propaganda and is now affiliated 
with PD (Price et al., 2008). One problem with defining 
it has been the changing technological nature of inter-
national broadcasting, particularly in light of the fact 
that target audiences are no longer necessarily limited 
to nation-state boundaries. More importantly, there 
are continuing questions about how objective or state-
serving international broadcasting services need to be. 
There is also the observation that new media and social 
media diminish the one-way flow that typified radio 
transmissions.  
The questions of objectivity involve issues of both 
intentional and unintentional support of state themes 
and positions on foreign affairs (Price et al., 2008). 
                                                          
7 http://www.bbg.gov/broadcasters/voa 
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From the early days of shortwave radio to the social 
media networking of today, international broadcasting 
has had to balance two competing commitments—one 
to objectivity in order to maintain credibility, and the 
other to serving the national security interest of the 
government it serves (Price et al., 2008). Strong critics 
of broadcasting for PD argue that the sources are al-
ways finding themselves in the role as “missionaries of 
ideological and cultural hegemony” (Price et al., 2008, 
p. 154). Others may note that what the BBG and State 
Department subscribe to in terms of objectivity does 
not have to be applied by the DOD or intelligence 
community messaging. Rhetoric about truth telling 
must therefore be qualified as applied to particular ar-
eas of government strategic communication. Tradition-
al state broadcasting and clandestine information 
transmission are not the same thing (Price et al., 2008). 
Some criticisms of international broadcasting assert 
that actual effects are difficult to identify. The BBG 
measures total audience size of broadcasts, website 
visits, program quality ratings by audiences, audience 
perceptions of program credibility, and audience reach 
(Weed, 2014). Audience reach is the percentage of au-
dience respondents who watch or listen weekly. An-
other variable measured is the percentage of audience 
respondents who say that certain programs have 
helped them understand current events more (Weed, 
2014). Generally, these data are very positive. For ex-
ample, in 2013, VOA had 100% of its audience rating its 
quality high, 89% on credibility, and 90% on under-
standing (Weed, 2014). Still, some critics say that in-
ternational broadcasting has not moved the needle in 
regard to advancing U.S. foreign policies and promot-
ing democracy (Weed, 2014). Perhaps some of this dis-
appointment results from an incomplete understand-
ing of what international broadcasting is legally 
required to do—present objective news in a manner 
consistent with American foreign policy.  
In 2014, a report on international broadcasting for 
the USG was released by the United States Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy. In that report, Nicho-
las Cull wrote an executive summary making the fol-
lowing observations. What has sometimes been viewed 
as unmeasurable it now subjected to multiple forms of 
tracking and analytics. Despite the fact that having 
more data about audience attitudes and behavior can 
help adjust programming, there is still the problem of 
political leaders consulting with public diplomats as 
they formulate policies (Cull, 2014). The commission 
report reminds us that international broadcasting is in-
tended to inform rather than persuade. At the same 
time, it must align with USG foreign policies and work 
against political extremism.  
As a complete reading of the national influence lit-
erature reveals, there are many domains of interna-
tional broadcasting, some of which is done by the BBG. 
The BBG oversees only civilian messages and network-
ing while the DOD has its own system of broadcasting. 
Within the BBG family of stations and websites, there 
are variations of purposes and strategies. Additionally, 
the intelligence community has covert broadcasting 
operations, which are obviously difficult to locate and 
describe. 
Historian Ron Robin (2005) argues that “Contempo-
rary public diplomacy appears trapped in a time warp… 
its architects are creatures of cold war triumphalism” 
(p. 347). Robin and others declare that American PD 
has replaced the monster of Communism with a new 
dragon to slay—terrorism. These critics say that such 
binary thinking neglects the complexities of identities 
and changes that should be studied. This line of criti-
cism says that existing approaches to national influ-
ence and international broadcasting gloss over the 
complexities involved in adversarial contexts. Robin 
(2005) charges that there is no yearning by Muslim 
populations to be liberated by Americans, but that is 
what Americans portray in their PD. Robin (2005) says 
a major problem with the use of American internation-
al broadcasting is the assumption by the sources that 
the receivers lack information, when in fact, they are 
inundated with various forms of information and 
communication. In other words, animosity toward the 
U.S. may result more from negative information rather 
than a lack of information.  
Some critics say that “U.S. public diplomacy has un-
dergone intensive reorganization and retooling as it 
takes on a more prominent propaganda role” (Kennedy 
& Lucas, 2005, p. 309). These kinds of criticisms imply 
that new forms of national influence are no different 
than those used in WWII and the Cold War, albeit tak-
ing new forms and using new technologies. There ap-
pears to be some suspicion of new terminology like 
“new public diplomacy” in such critiques. Such argu-
ments go far as to say that the new public diplomacy, 
like the old, is not only serving national security, but al-
so imperium building (Kennedy & Lucas, 2005).  
In fact, despite the propaganda roots of national in-
fluence, it is not necessary for national influence or 
strategic influence to serve the needs of empire build-
ing, hegemony, or political warfare. This makes charges 
of “cultural imperialism” interesting, but inconclusive. 
Certainly, information warfare, information operations, 
and propaganda can be part of a nationalistic strategic 
influence, but other, perhaps larger, parts can include 
cultural networking, networking of policies, and collab-
orative policy directions. There is no realistic denial of 
national influence (SC, PD) serving the interests of the 
state, but the interests of the state can move from uni-
polar to multipolar, and unilateral to multilateral. With 
increasing interdependence of economic, political, and 
military systems, there is good reason to expect more 
attention to the potential of network diplomacy. The 
question here is how international broadcasting, born 
in the old paradigm, can contribute to the new one. 
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Searching for something sinister in national influence 
campaigns that are used in many ways at various levels 
of transparency may be more interesting than produc-
tive. It is true that the State Department’s George Ken-
nan had a plan in 1948 called “organized political war-
fare,” but we must ask why we should expect him to 
not have such a plan.8  
There is critical scholarship in the social sciences 
that views national influence as contemporary propa-
ganda, regardless of new terminology and new ap-
proaches to international communication. One argu-
ment is against the Obama administration’s focus on 
global engagement. It accuses the USG of using en-
gagement in the same way used in corporate public re-
lations and marketing. The accusation is that this pro-
duces contrived dialogue rather than genuine dialogue 
(Comor & Bean, 2012). Additionally, the use of Public 
Diplomacy 2.0 is charged with being a means to facili-
tate and enlarge a PD approach that is not workable. 
Comor and Bean (2012) suggest that the new public re-
lations “two-way symmetrical model” is simply doing 
public relations for the public relations profession. 
They also argue that the co-creational arguments made 
by new PD scholars are selling something no more ef-
fective than the Charlotte Beers marketing approach to 
extremist terrorism. Moreover, they argue that just as 
the theory of symmetrical relationships between com-
panies and consumers has not been proven to work, 
the USG has not explained how it can begin to create 
such relationships (Comor & Bean, 2012). As for the 
claims about individual empowerment through Web 
2.0 technologies, some say these are more related to 
Wired magazine articles than empirical evidence 
(Comor & Bean, 2012).9 
In the history of PD provided by Michael Schneider 
(2015), it appears that there is not only the story about 
America that gets told, but also the story about PD. 
One interesting chapter of the PD  story is the attempt 
by the USG after 9/11, to gain more worldwide support 
for what Americans called the “war on terror.” The 
goals were fairly clear, but the communication strate-
gies were not. Between 2001 and 2013, there were 7 
different undersecretaries of Public Diplomacy and 
Public Affairs at the State Department (Schneider, 
2015). The point of this observation is simply that con-
sistent leadership in national influence is difficult when 
the leaders keep leaving. None of the seven stayed on 
for more than two years. The last two undersecretaries 
appeared to be more credentialed in journalism than in 
                                                          
8 http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafou 
nding3.htm 
9 While these scholars have made points worthy of delibera-
tion, they have not proven that engagement online or offline 
cannot be improved in ways that free the new approach from 
the old advertising paradigm.  
international relations.10 Some of the undersecretaries 
advocated new listening, better relationship building, 
and newer communication technology efforts (Schnei-
der, 2015). In response to slow and inadequate civilian 
USG responses to terrorism communication, the DOD 
developed its own forms of SC influence. In time, the 
Obama administration developed means to bring to-
gether concepts used by both the DOS and the DOD for 
national influence, particularly against terrorism 
(Schneider, 2015). Two “whole of government” ap-
proaches supported by the White House included the 
Center for Counter-terrorism Communications (CSCC) 
and the National Counterterrorism Center (Schneider, 
2015, p. 20). The Obama administration makes it clear 
that its attempt to use SC and global engagement in-
cludes efforts to “engage audiences on positive terms,” 
but also “discrediting, denigrating, and delegitimizing 
al-Qa’ida and violent extremist ideology” (White 
House, 2010, p. 6).  
7. The New Public Diplomacy  
The older versions of public diplomacy appear to be 
more like propaganda than the more recent versions. 
The newer arguments about public diplomacy advocate 
more interactive approaches to communication with 
other nations and populations. While the new media 
(Internet-based) have not replaced the old media (pre-
World Wide Web), there is an important blurring of 
content production and content consumption in to-
day’s media ecology. New media present vast amounts 
of channels and networking platforms for locating, 
producing, and disseminating various forms of com-
munication content. While the State Department has 
attempted to use social media for the constant goals of 
strategic influence, there is scant evidence of success in 
this area. Worse yet, there are several examples of 
DOS disasters in design including the recent video 
about running to ISIS rather than walking.11 Perhaps 
letting go of a dominance paradigm for foreign affairs 
now still held by the United States government (de-
spite academic claims to the contrary), could make 
more effective uses of new and social media possible. 
Clearly, the goals of security and global positioning will 
direct the influence of activities of the government, de-
spite what labels are given to them.  
Many lessons have been learned from the older 
                                                          
10 Richard Stengel, current head, for example is a former editor 
of Time magazine and journalism professor. (http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/221669.htm). The previous head 
was Tara D. Sonenshine, whose background was in strategic 
communication for organizations, foreign policy, and media 
production (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/18745 
4.htm). She only stayed on for two years.  
11 This video is attempted DOS information operations: 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/09/09/state-
department-enters-propaganda-war-with-isis.html 
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days of PD that guide what is now formulated as new 
PD. One strong lesson is that PD cannot make up for 
bad policies and PD does not work if it contradicts for-
eign policies or military operations (Melissen, 2007). 
New PD is less propagandistic than older PD and re-
quires news skills than those found in traditional PD 
(Melissen, 2007). It is also focused more on engage-
ment with other cultures. This engagement includes 
links with civil society organizations and publics 
through non-governmental channels (Melissen, 2007). 
Jan Melissen (2007) cautions that too much coordina-
tion between policies and PD can create negative im-
pressions. To distance itself as much as possible from 
propaganda, new PD seeks dialogue and two-way 
communication as opposed to the one-way persuasion 
efforts of propaganda (Melissen, 2007). Some of the 
new PD is related to the cultural relations effort going 
back to the establishment of the cultural relations of-
fice in the DOS in 1938. Efforts at cultural relations 
stress engagement with other populations in various 
cultural partnerships, not in the one-way manner of 
Nelson Rockefeller’s efforts in Latin America, but in the 
sense of long-term trust building (Arndt, 2005; Melis-
sen, 2007). Thus, new PD can conduct traditional per-
suasion efforts while adding more endeavors for rela-
tionship building (Melissen, 2007). 
New PD brings a stronger focus not only on cultural 
relations and trust building, but also networking of in-
terests, cultures, and diplomacy itself. Hierarchical in-
formation flow (marketing, propaganda, advertising, 
public relations) models of PD are challenged today by 
new PD models that stress policy formation networking 
and collaborative policy making over unilateral policies 
sold by good selling techniques (Hocking, 2007). While 
new PD is less one-way informational than new PD, 
which is more dialogic and cooperative, we have to 
question the equation of the old PD with broadcasting. 
Pamment (2013), for example, states that new PD 
“represents a break from the ‘broadcasting’ models 
and takes advantage of social media to establish two-
way engagement with the public” (p. 3).  It is important 
to recognize that international broadcasting, when 
linked with websites, social media, and other platforms 
may become more like the converged media we see 
with other channels. 
While our history of international broadcasting 
necessarily stressed radio, it is very important to note 
that today’s international broadcasting involves much 
more than radio and TV, as the Internet has provided 
many new channels over time. For example, the USG’s 
International Information Programs Bureau (IIP) today 
makes efforts with numerous websites designed to at-
tract young people. These sites along with Facebook, 
mobile phone apps and other new media appeals, at-
tempts to disseminate important PD information. It al-
so employs various forms of analytics to track what 
messages are having specific effects with particular 
types of audience members (Schneider, 2015). The IIP 
has distributed over 300,000 e-books to other nations 
(Schneider, 2015). Despite the new media, however, 
most people in the world still get their information 
about the world from radio and TV (Schneider, 2015). 
Such observations make it clear that the USG is updating 
its technological tools for international broadcasting. 
The question now is whether or not the messages and 
the communication strategies are also being updated.  
Today’s shifts in using international broadcasting 
for PD appear to stress more two-way communication 
between PD senders and receivers, and more network-
ing attention which can bring into focus non-state ac-
tors who can be influential with various audiences 
(Powers & Samuel-Azran, 2015). After 9/11, USG inter-
national broadcasting increased its pro-America news. 
USG networks like Al Hurra (satellite TV) have to com-
pete with the political news of Arab networks such as 
Al Jazeera and Al-Arabiya (financed by Saudi Arabia), 
and have had small effects on attitudes about the U.S. 
(Powers & Samuel-Azran, 2015).  
According to Maloney (2015), the use of social me-
dia for PD displays its limitations. Maloney argues that 
the Iranian situation illustrates the possible over-
reliance on PD to the exclusion of traditional diploma-
cy. She argues that the recent negotiations between 
Iran and America are due to traditional diplomacy, not 
public diplomacy or digital public diplomacy. With ad-
vances in international broadcasting capabilities into 
Iran, the government there responds with new 
measures to suppress expansion and effects. Maloney 
suggests that the strong concern about international 
broadcasting reflects the effect that international 
broadcasting is having on Iranians. In 2001, the Iranian 
government ordered the filtering of all websites that 
are deemed anti-government or anti-Islam. In 2003, 
harsher measures were taken including arresting jour-
nalists and bloggers. Weed (2014) argues that there 
are disagreements today about how this form of PD 
works best in an age of digital media and networking 
and also the exact ways it contributes to democracy 
and US foreign policy objectives.  
While it is tempting to say that the old PD is faded 
or fading, studies show that new PD may not be mov-
ing as fast in practice as it is in academic discourse 
(Pamment, 2013). This lag may parallel the disconnect 
between how scholars talk about social media and de-
mocracy and what is actually found in empirical data 
(Hacker & van Dijk, 2000). One scholar argues “Record 
a few minutes of video on your phone, post it on 
YouTube, and millions can watch whatever you have 
decided is newsworthy” (Seib, 2012, p. 9). The problem 
with this statement is the fact that posting a video on 
YouTube might get a dozen views or a million views 
depending on factors that go well beyond simply post-
ing content. With social media, there is always poten-
tial for progress, but it is wise to keep a realistic view of 
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what changes are actually occurring. One interesting 
point of separation between older PD and newer PD is 
that the latter is more likely to build on narrative in an 
inductive manner while the former is more likely to use 
grand national narratives that are distributed 
(Pamment, 2013). Research in IO, done in the bat-
tlespace of open confrontations, shows that grand nar-
ratives are not likely to work in today’s world of asym-
metric conflicts (Perna, 2009).  
Having reviewed some important aspects of the his-
tory of American national influence, how international 
broadcasting attempts to turn away from old diploma-
cy and toward new public diplomacy, how strategic in-
fluence and global engagement should be used togeth-
er for national goals, and some strong criticisms and of 
broadcasting and public diplomacy, we now move into 
a discussion of how international broadcasting can be 
part of an integration of mass communication with so-
cial media and digital communication.  
8. Building a Unified Model of Strategic Influence and 
Global Engagement  
According to Bruce Gregory (2008), PD and SC are es-
sentially the same thing—governmental persuasion. 
However, Gregory wants to separate PD and SC from 
information operations (IO). Like Joseph Nye, he com-
bines the concepts of coercion, persuasion, and attrac-
tion into the concept of “smart power.” Gregory says 
that PD and SC are open persuasion and IO is covert or 
hidden persuasion.12 Gregory also makes the important 
                                                          
12 Strategic influence can be overt or covert and can include in-
observation that the DOS and the DOD are not the only 
stakeholders in PD and SC. There are also private inter-
ests and civil society organizations involved in their 
own ways of doing PD. There is an alternative to using 
IO which is basically in the arsenal of communication 
weaponry used more by the military and the intelli-
gence community than by other USG sectors.13 That al-
ternative is strategic influence as we have been dis-
cussing it.  
Because there is a full spectrum of threats to na-
tional security, it is necessary to develop a full spec-
trum of security and communication strategies for all 
of those threats. This is true for both times of peace as 
well as times of wars and violent conflicts. In Figure 1, 
the argument is visually depicted as global engagement 
(cultural relations, partnerships) combining what are 
often thought of as competitive and exclusive aspects 
of strategic influence. 
The main arguments of this perspective begin with 
the claim that separations, or stovepipes between SC 
done by the military, IO done by the military and the 
IC, PD done by the diplomacy community, and tradi-
tional diplomacy are useful for firewalling tactics. How-
ever, they are not useful for the integration of neces-
sary goals of communication that best serves national 
security concerns.  
                                                                                           
formation operations. How secretive IO is in practice is subject 
to debate.  
13 Technically, military or intelligence community IO can also 
include violent actions such as cyber-attacks, electronic war-
fare (EW) and kinetic attacks on communication or information 
infrastructures.  
 
Figure 1. Parallel paths of strategic influence and global engagement. 
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8.1. Cultural Networking and Global Engagement  
Zaharna (2010) maps out a spectrum of national influ-
ence that might be useful moving forward in coming 
years. The older focus on strategic information and in-
fluence can work with the newer focus on building re-
lationships in her model. The relational side of a full-
spectrum framework focuses on the construction of 
social structures to advance political objectives. Zahar-
na’s (2010) new vision is based on the argument that 
SC and PD must include both information and relation-
al perspectives. In fact, she says that the two should be 
integrated. She uses interpersonal communication as a 
useful analogy in her view, for recognizing how both 
relational and informational aspects of communication 
are essential. Rather than relying so much on battles 
for hearts and minds, her approach focuses more on 
building cultural bridges.  
After 9/11, Zaharna (2010) notes that the U.S. 
mainly used transmission (mass communication) mod-
els of PD to attempt to generate soft power. However, 
she argues that connection, relationship-building, and 
networking approaches, as used by NGOs, appear to be 
more effective. The U.S. was not generating soft power 
as much as it was trying to persuade people about it 
(“wielding soft power”). The older approach stresses 
message content over message exchange. This trans-
mission model of soft power is essentially a propagan-
da model as the messages are one-sided, carefully con-
trolled, and designed for changing receivers, not 
senders. Essentially, you are attempting to get the 
message receivers to do want what you, the message 
sender, desire. The goal is about more compliance than 
collaboration.  
Network diplomacy, long advocated by Zaharna 
(2010), is an alternative to propaganda-based national 
influence. Networking persuasion or influence builds 
on the recurrent finding in communication research 
that the best avenues of persuasion are interpersonal 
networks. Viewing strategic influence in terms of sys-
tems helps us to recognize that various channels of 
communication have specific functions and also that 
these functions can change the activity situation of an 
individual. Thus, a person who normally attends politi-
cal news with Internet and TV sources, may become a 
radio news listener during times of driving a car. Net-
work weavers are people in social networks who create 
network links with others. (Zaharna, 2010). A very im-
portant part of influence networks are called hubs. 
Hubs are people in social networks that have high cen-
trality in the networks—people who through messages 
pass to get to other members of the network. Many 
political networks that receive or diffuse PD message 
are all-channel networks in which there are many hubs 
and messages are not easily diffused in linear steps or 
flows. Leadership is shared in these kinds of networks.  
Zaharna (2010) notes that narratives are important 
to these networks because the storytelling helps to 
produce shared group and network identity. Both 
strong ties (people you know well and trust highly) and 
weak ties (people you know but are not close to) are 
important to network influence and how PD is affected 
by networks of reception, interpretation, and dissemi-
nation. Diversity of network members help bring new 
ideas and perspectives into social interaction. Mem-
bers who link diverse groups are known as “cultural 
bridges.” Master narratives are used to frame prob-
lems and solutions for networks. Stories are local and 
master narratives are global. Stories are used to recruit 
people into networks. Networking approaches con-
ducted with stories and narratives are not the same as 
mass communication or propaganda model of “telling 
our story” or narrative. While narratives in the older In-
formation Model are used to persuade and sell and 
stories are shaped to be marketed, the narratives in 
the Networking Model are shaped by both senders and 
receivers. 
8.2. New Media Networking and National Influence  
Societies with communication that was mainly orga-
nized with mass media were known as mass societies 
or information societies. Societies with communication 
that is organized mainly with Internet and wireless 
networking are known as network societies (van Dijk, 
2012). Counter-power is exercised in the network soci-
ety by fighting to change the programs of specific net-
works and by the effort to disrupt the switches that re-
flect dominant interests and replace them with 
alternative switches between networks. Actors are 
humans, but humans are organized in networks. Hu-
man networks act in networks via the programming 
and switching of organizational networks. In the net-
work society, power and counter-power aim funda-
mentally at influencing the neural networks in the hu-
man mind by using mass communication networks and 
mass self-communication networks (Castells, 2009, 
2010). It is important to note that international broad-
casting will have to become integrated with the net-
works we are describing to optimizes its relevance for 
national influence.  
Castells (2011) describes a new global public sphere 
for public diplomacy that results from increasing glob-
alization and interconnections with new communica-
tion technologies. This argument is idealistic and inter-
esting, but is not as useful as his basic principles of 
network theory and power. In view of these principles, 
even smaller nations can join in international debates 
more than ever before and also increase their influence 
on how international crises are framed. While we do not 
agree with his claim that public diplomacy is “diplomacy 
of the public, not of the government” (Castells, 2011, p. 
78), we see merit in Castells’ arguments about a possible 
global sphere of networked citizens of the world having 
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the ability to deliberate and debate world issues in far 
easier ways that ever before. While the new electronic 
spheres of deliberation made possible with emerging 
network technologies may allow more networking of 
government, non-government organizations, civil socie-
ty, and citizens alone, there are opportunities for PD to 
be used in these spheres for engagement and influence. 
If online global spaces for people from different cultures 
are able to facilitate the deliberation of political issues in 
a kind of online civil society, there may be potential for 
what Castells (2011) refers to as “the movement of pub-
lic opinion, made up turbulences of information in a di-
versified media system” (p. 86). Castells’ view of PD is 
that of networked communication, cultural engagement, 
and shared meanings.  
Castells’ work shows that new media networking al-
lows new social spaces where power can be shaped 
(2007). Castells (2007) describes a trend where “mass 
media and horizontal communication networks are 
converging” (p. 238). Thinking shapes norms and social 
interaction in the new online spaces affect thinking. As 
Castells (2007) explains, “the battle of the human mind 
is largely played out in the processes of communica-
tion” (p. 239). This is also true of power relations. Per-
haps it is also true for the effects of national influence. 
In the age of mass communication, theories like the 
two-step flow of communication could explain mes-
sage diffusion and some aspects of network influence. 
Today, however in the age of networking and new me-
dia, multiple-step theories of communication are re-
quired to explain where message are diffused and how 
networks of influence are affected by SC and PD. We 
also have to look at media ecologies rather than simple 
single-media descriptions of effects. This is because 
people live in multimedia environments and receive 
from multiple channels and use multiple channels to 
create their own content as well.  
Social media cannot be reduced to one platform of 
social networking in any attempt to explain how net-
working operates with new media. Thus, Twitter stud-
ies will not say much about Facebook and vice versa 
and research on one of these will be limited to just one 
part of social media. This is why it is important to study 
more than networks of people and to also examine 
networks of new media and various usages of them 
dynamically affect various actions of users. While mes-
sage receivers are always involved in producing mean-
ings for what they perceive in communication, social 
media allow receivers an increasing amount of control 
over personal interpretations as they process political 
content. If this becomes more empirically verifiable, we 
can suggest that social media are part of a communica-
tion ecology that affords more control or influence 
over how political situations are defined and framed 
(Altheide, 1995). When we adopt the concept of media 
ecology or perhaps new media ecology we are led to 
step past old notions of single users with single tech-
nologies accomplishing significant political work. 
Social media involve connection technologies used 
via the Internet for purposes of social interaction with 
other users. Social networking sites (SNS) include Face-
book, Twitter, LinkedIn, Reddit, YouTube, etc. Each one 
has its own features and usage affordances. Each can 
be linked to all of the others in whatever constellation 
determined by users one by one. Van Dijck and Poell 
(2013) refer to this as an “expansive ecosystem of con-
nective media” (p. 5). These researchers are careful to 
avoid falling into the trap of explaining social media by 
their affordances, either individually or in interopera-
ble linkages. Other researchers observe ways that in-
ternational broadcasting can be integrated with social 
media. Tufan (2014), notes that social media and Inter-
net usage provide opportunities for interactivity among 
users that are not found in typical mass media envi-
ronments. However, broadcasting sources can easily 
link to social media platforms that connection spheres 
of user interactivity to spheres of typical audience re-
ception. Accordingly, “new program formats have been 
developed that use these platforms to enable listeners 
and viewers to directly and easily interact with running 
radio or television programs” (Tufan, 2014, p. 95). 
Communication research has long documented the 
active nature of audiences (Castells, 2007). At the same 
time, we also know that commercial and political inter-
ests affect just how free various new forms of commu-
nication actually are in terms of political content. With 
new media, it is possible to have what Castells (2007) 
labels “mass self-communication.” The key here is ex-
panding horizontal networks of communication that 
connect global to local messages. Castells describes 
mass self-communication as a network created by indi-
viduals in their personal configurations of Internet, 
Web, cell phone, and other new media. We suspect we 
should add all possible media including both old and 
new, and also offline interpersonal connections. Fol-
lowing the communication power theory of Castells, 
we can see that power and influence are increasingly 
related to networks of meaning that are formed in new 
geometries of multiple communication channels.  
Applying Castells theory to international broadcast-
ing cases of message challenges by adversarial groups 
or nations or state governments, autonomous horizon-
tal networks linked to more global networks can pro-
vide a more useful model that old-fashioned point-to-
receiver models. This is because the new media/social 
networks can challenge the information received from 
governments and adversarial organization. Broadcast 
media, as used by international broadcasting, should 
become less one-directional while expanding horizon-
tal networks that converge old media channels and 
new media platforms (Castells, 2007).  
An uncritical view of “Public Diplomacy 2.0” or one 
that is theory-free can generate beliefs in an exagger-
ated role for social media and digital communication in 
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regard to national influence. While much of public di-
plomacy is offline, online components of influence join 
in systems of information and social interaction that 
make the importance of new media fairly clear (Grego-
ry, 2014). As Bruce Gregory (2014) notes, the revolt of 
the “Arab Spring” involved much more than social me-
dia like Facebook. Other facts like corruption, scarci-
ties, TV, military actions, and street activities were also 
part of the total picture. A great deal of research has 
yet to be done to sufficiently clarify how the various 
channels of social media form systems of information 
flow and influence. The same is true for how the old 
media and new media work together. As Gregory 
(2014) argues, “It is easy to argue the importance of 
technologies in the abstract; it is harder to refine the 
operational implications” (p. 13).  
A system of national influence includes all forms of 
SC and PD. This can be seen in Figure 2. The proposi-
tions used in building this model begin with the need 
to end the stove-piping of various forms of national in-
fluence without making them all sound the same. It al-
so attempts to bring together what has been concep-
tually separated since the end of the USIA, that is, the 
separation of strategic influence from public diploma-
cy. Another proposition concerns that roles of smart 
diplomacy in determining what blends of strategic in-
fluence and global engagement are most likely to be 
effective in particular situations. A fourth proposition 
links the various forms of diplomacy, ranging from soft-
power oriented forms like cultural diplomacy to more 
hard-power forms like coercive diplomacy, into the 
practice of smart diplomacy. 
The propositions in the model of national power and 
influence shown above are grounded in the assump-
tion that strategic influence (strategic communication, 
public diplomacy) can be logically paired with the goals 
of global engagement. International broadcasting is as-
sumed to have roles to play in every part of the model. 
We stress engagement because it appears that en-
hanced global engagement is the lodestar for much of 
the argumentation done today about a new PD and the 
need for network diplomacy. We believe engagement, 
when genuine, is like the traditional arguments about 
the “last three miles” of diplomacy.  
The reasoning for this model of power and influ-
ence is somewhat consistent with the integrated model 
for public diplomacy argued by Guy Golan. The Golan 
model has three levels of USG influence domains. The 
first, called mediated public diplomacy, involves strate-
gic framing and competition over framing. Golan 
(2015) notes that “Governments must recognize that 
public diplomacy does not occur in a vacuum” (p. 418). 
As noted earlier, despite enormous penetration of new 
media, most people still get a great deal of political in-
formation from the old media (Golan, 2015). Ironically, 
international broadcasting may take on new important 
roles at the time that they are dismissed by some as 
Cold War relics. The three domains described by Golan 
(2015) are mediated public diplomacy, nation branding 
or image management, and relational or network man-
agement. While his model does not approach the total-
ity of USG strategic communication/national influence 
needs, it does provide a useful model for integrating 
the PC side of American governmental persuasion. It 
also provides a useful context for some of the aspects 
of international broadcasting which need improving.  
Golan’s (2015) concept of mediated public diplo-
macy refers to strategic framing. Strategic framing is 
akin to framing done by political campaigns and in-
volves a competition for agenda setting at both the 
first-order (setting news and public agendas) and sec-
ond-order levels (salience, interpretations). Therefore, 
Golan argues that mass media and public relations 
theories can be applied in this area of PD. Robert Ent-
man (2008) argues that mediated public diplomacy 
consists of strong USG attempts, led by the White 
House to control the framing of American policies. 
Thus, we can see that international broadcasting has a 
sustained role in USG frame setting and frame compe-
tition. 
 
Figure 2. Model of strategic influence and global engagement. 
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Golan’s (2015) second PD domain is nation building 
and reputation management. The problem with this 
domain is that it can rely too much on persuasion 
strategies imported from business—marketing, adver-
tising, etc. On the other hand, branding can work if 
media framing has already successfully framed a na-
tion is positive ways (Golan, 2015). More important, 
perhaps, is Golan’s (2015) third domain, relationship 
formation and management. This third view assumes 
that increasing positive long-term relationships be-
tween Americans and others in the world can improve 
America’s image as well as increase the nation’s soft 
power.  
8.3. Culture and International Engagement  
Cull (2013) observes that engagement with other cul-
tures to the extent that policies involving them, are re-
lated to effective listening and feedback processes. 
Foreign policy is adjusted to foreign opinion, not simply 
thrust at it. Cull (2013) argues that cultural exchange 
where both sides of the exchanges learn about each 
other. He also makes the case that broadcasting that is 
objective news lowers filtering. Objectivity is perceived 
as more ethical than propaganda and ethical commu-
nication is generally more persuasive. On the other 
hand, he acknowledges that a nation has to respond to 
the types of strategic communication used by its ad-
versaries. When the USSR was found to be using in-
tense psychological warfare against the U.S., the latter 
decided to do the same. 
Military analysts have found that America has trou-
ble communicating with other nations and cultures be-
cause analysis of existing “background conversations” 
present in the cultural contexts is sparse. With poor 
analysis of cultural terrains and contexts, no amount of 
PD modeling will have significant effect on populations 
who resent America policies. Background conversa-
tions are cultural backdrops which add contexts for 
producing and understating explicit conversations 
(Perna, 2009). For example, American soldiers saw no 
harm in placing an American flag over the head on a 
statue of Saddam Hussein they helped to pull down. To 
the Iraqis, the action symbolized what was in their 
background conversations, that is, that Americans are 
conquerors (Perna, 2009). For the kinds of political 
changes that America seeks with using SC and PD, it is 
necessary to use communication platforms like inter-
national broadcasting linked to new media, social me-
dia, and interpersonal networks to challenge the back-
ground conversations and replace bad ones with good 
ones when possible. It is easy for people with similar 
cultures and poetics to use social media and new me-
dia networking (Seib, 2007). But a more important 
challenge for national influence and international 
broadcasting is how you get people with dissimilar 
backgrounds to network.  
8.4. Strategic Influence 
While cultural relations and networks are very im-
portant to new public diplomacy, it is also critical to 
remember that there are adversaries also putting out 
their own SC and PD messages. If we look at Iran, for 
example, it is inadequate and non-explanatory to simp-
ly list channels that send signals into that nation. In-
stead, we have to study the SC and PD done by the Ira-
nian government as contextual background for where 
USG influence is likely to have significant effects. As 
America has its arsenal of international broadcasting 
channels, the Iranian government has its Islamic Re-
public of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) system (Tiedeman, 
2005). Iran has no equivalent of Smith-Mundt Act re-
strictions on propagandizing its domestic audience. The 
IRIB employs 24 languages for its messages (Tiedeman, 
2005). While some of its broadcasting aims to familiar-
ize other nations with Iran’s history and culture, its 
Voice of Justice programming is focused on criticizing 
American interventionist policies (Tiedeman, 2005). 
In over three decades, Iran and the U.S. did not 
have formal diplomatic relations. Despite recent nego-
tiations and a recent famous deal over Iranian nuclear 
programs, both national governments remain suspicious 
of each other. In recent years, however, the DOS has 
developed some online strategies for increasing dia-
logue and trust-building (Fialho & Wallin, 2013). The 
online tools are used along with other forms of PD and 
also traditional diplomacy. In 2011, the DOS launched 
the Virtual Embassy Tehran. The purpose for this Web 
hub is to increase communication between the USG 
and Iranian citizens (Fialho & Wallin, 2013). It has the 
dual roles of promoting mutual understanding and re-
futing misinformation. One goal is to shape the views 
of Iranian youths (Fialho & Wallin, 2013). This site pro-
vides what Fialho and Wallin (2013) call “virtual en-
gagement” (p. 3). About 50% of Iranians use the Inter-
net today, but the Virtual Embassy Tehran website was 
blocked by the Iranian government soon after it 
opened (Fialho & Wallin, 2013). However, despite the 
fact that most of the site hits are coming from outside 
of Iran, the DOS believes that Iranians view the site us-
ing proxy servers (Fialho & Wallin, 2013). In additional 
to the virtual embassy, the DOS has a Farsi Facebook 
page, a Twitter account, Google+, YouTube, and a Farsi 
blog. The DOS believes that 60% of the Facebook visi-
tors are inside of Iran (Fialho & Wallin, 2013). 
Another area of concern for strategic influence in 
counter-terrorism and counter-propaganda. Seib 
(2011) argues that PD can be used to prevent terror-
ism, acting as a preventative measure. However, he al-
so acknowledges that PD can be used to counter ter-
rorist messages. This is what is commonly known as 
counter-propaganda, but counter-propaganda does 
not have to become propaganda itself. In other words, 
truthfulness and factuality can be used to challenge 
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propaganda. This may be a major role that internation-
al broadcasting continues. Propaganda and counter-
propaganda increasingly come from multiple media 
sources and ecologies of media (Althiede, 1995; van 
Dijck & Poell, 2013). While our news media constantly 
reminds us of how terrorist groups like ISIL use social 
media for persuasion and recruiting, we hear little 
about how populations subjected to terrorist intimida-
tion can use social media to develop resistance forces 
against the terrorists (Seib, 2011).  
8.5. Persuasion Theory and Social Science 
The model proposed here uses theories from commu-
nication studies, psychology, and network science to 
guide its arguments about influence. The USG uses 
many theories from science and social science to in-
form its influence operations, whether they be PD or 
IO. However, they are argue that there are still many 
uncertainties as to which approaches work best when 
attempting various processes of political persuasion. 
Larson et al. (2009) present a military model of 
governmental influence. They call it “influence opera-
tions” (p. 5). They correctly note that influence is con-
ducted by three major spheres of the USG—DOD, DOS, 
and the IC. Two theoretical views adopted by these 
military scholars are diffusion theory and social net-
work analysis. The former provides useful generaliza-
tions about opinion leaders and how interpersonal 
communication can aid the transmission and ac-
ceptance of message. The latter informs the influenc-
ers about key network members and how ideas move 
through networks. They also use the persuasion meth-
ods advocated by international relations expert Alex-
ander George. George (2003) recommends that influ-
ential third parties, working with moderates rather 
than hardliners, and encouraging constituents to pres-
sure their leaders are effective means of using direct 
methods of influence in international situations. 
George’s work is called actor-specific because it argues 
that influence outcomes depend on characteristics of 
leaders involved, the nature of their conflict, and vari-
ous situational factors. 
Larson et al. (2009) make note of the many theories 
of persuasion available for operational use by USG in-
fluence experts. These theories include Expectancy 
Value Theory, the Elaboration Likelihood Model, and 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory. They argue that many of 
these theories lack sufficient explanation and predic-
tion of actual behavioral change to be as useful as re-
quired by influence operations which attitudes, behav-
iors, and reason have to be tracked across time to 
measure dynamical changes in relation to message 
changes. They note that marketing research suffers 
from the same application problems as some of the 
persuasion research, observing, for example, that 
about half of advertising spending may be wasted on 
efforts that have little or no desired effects (Larson et 
al., 2009).  
The science of influence that concerns these practi-
tioners is how to influence the decisions that are made 
by target audience, not in labs, but in complex social 
and political environments. Thus, they develop a model 
from multiple theoretical sources to attempt a scien-
tific approach to gaining message entry into social en-
vironments and specific persuasive effects for those 
messages. This is akin to campaign persuasion de-
scribed by persuasion theorists. The communication 
involved uses multiple levels of progressive effects and 
many channels to carry key messages. Their observa-
tions are consistent with the need in communication 
studies to use multi-theory, multi-level approaches to 
message design (Monge & Contractor, 2003) 
These experts gravitate toward expectancy utility 
models of influence. Such models are used by IC for 
persuasion. Their goals include not only influencing 
positive audiences but also adversarial ones and doing 
so in ways that account for the complexities of political 
contexts. For example, where there are two opposing 
forces and one involves the U.S., they look for actor 
variables, conflict variables, and situational variables to 
determine what kinds of diplomacy may or may not 
work. Their expectancy utility models include data re-
garding identification of key groups that can exert in-
fluence, ranges of policy outcomes, policy preferences, 
and estimates of how much groups consider various is-
sues. The science of such modeling comes from re-
search done on political decision making, voting behav-
ior, and game theory. Such a model employed in 2002 
predicted the U.S. would win the war on Iraq in 2003, 
that Saddam Hussein would fall, and that a prolonged 
insurgency would follow (Kugler, Tammen, & Efird, 
2004; Larson, et al., 2009). Snyder (2013) also argues 
for more reliance on social science when analyzing 
what might work better in PD.  
8.6. Networking and System Roles for International 
Broadcasting  
Advocates of new public diplomacy and social media in 
strategic influence in general, believe that networking 
is a strong positive alternative to the message trans-
mission approaches of the past, including international 
broadcasting. During World War II, and the Cold War, it 
was possible to assume that other populations were in 
need of more and more accurate information provided 
by the U.S. and its allies. However, such an assumption 
of information deficits today may be problematic due 
to the rapid and widespread of information through 
the Internet and its multitude of connection technolo-
gies. As Joseph Nye (2004) notes, the challenge of 
transmitting scarce information is thing of the past. 
Nye also argues that an abundance of information to-
day can actually produce a scarcity of attention. Strong 
 Media and Communication, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 69-91 86 
critics of public diplomacy today argue that interna-
tional broadcasting is stuck in past views of influence 
that were the beginnings of Radio Free Europe and the 
Voice of America. Robin (2005) makes the crucial point 
that today the adversaries facing United States are 
employing open information rather than censorship to 
confront the U.S. This may suggest the continuous 
need for both information and counter-information.  
Some observers doubt that international broadcast-
ing has a useful role today, in a time far different from 
the origins of this kind of broadcasting, namely World 
War II and the Cold War. Wimbash and Portale (2015) 
argue that the missions among the international broad-
casting networks need to be brought into better align-
ment. Because these networks are part of the USG, they 
should not try to be like CNN or other government-free 
sources. Perhaps they can be fair and informative with-
out pretending to be highly objective. Calling the present 
state of USG international broadcasting “outdated and 
ineffectual,” Wimbash and Portale (2015) argue that the 
present international broadcasting structure and prac-
tices should be terminated (p. 6). Hillary Clinton recently 
labeled the role of international broadcasting as “de-
funct” (Wimbash and Portale, 2015, p. 7). Yet, even 
some of these critics believe that international broad-
casting can be reorganized into a useful part of strategic 
communication and public diplomacy.  
Network theory allows us to see how networking 
can easily trump old schemes for broadcasting. Social 
media networks can bypass traditional sources of 
agenda-setting, framing, and control. Traditional 
broadcasting misses the power of networking with In-
ternet-based connection technologies like smartphone 
and social media sites.  
Both Zaharna and Castells reflect current communi-
cation research regarding how people are using hori-
zontal networks to produce both a “connective mind-
shift” and also new ways of exchanging information 
and sharing interpretations of events in the world 
(Zaharna, Fisher, & Arsenault, 2013, p. 1). Recent de-
scriptions of new media and social media platforms in-
dicate network structures but not what people do 
those structures (Zaharna, 2013). What they accom-
plish with those structures is central to the model we 
propose here. Collaboration by using the structures is 
new public diplomacy and collaborative diplomacy 
which serve the objectives of both strategic influence 
and global engagement.  
Communication networks online are only one part 
of human networks. Another part is constituted by of-
fline communication that is also part of the network 
formations and interactions. Unlike certain systems 
that work within organizational boundaries, like politi-
cal systems, networks can cross all kinds of boundaries, 
including some cultural ones. As Seib (2012) notes 
“Technology propels broader social networks” (p. 125). 
Nodes (people) in a social network not only link to each 
other but can also link to the people in each other’s 
networks. Thus, one network can be a node in another 
network (Seib, 2012). Scholars of international politics 
have observed that nation-state sovereignty remains 
powerful, yet nation-states are having to work togeth-
er more due to the expansion of global connectivity 
and international interdependencies (Slaughter, 2004). 
When these connections work well, nation-states work 
on common goals. It is in this historical and political 
context, that international broadcasting must seek 
some new roles and sustained relevance.  
In the World War II and Cold War days of interna-
tional broadcasting, messages were pretty much point-
to-many and served mainly as propaganda or counter-
propaganda. Today, we see that international broad-
casting can become more interactive by including more 
interviews and debates which allows more two-way 
communication on a traditionally one-way platform. 
With new media, international broadcasting can also 
incorporate more interactive Internet-based channels 
like Twitter, which allow feedback rather than trans-
mission alone.  
While some scholars are breathless about PD 2.0, 
others doubt that it has much utility. Snyder (2013) for 
example, says that the hoped for effects of social and 
new media on PD effectiveness have not been demon-
strated. He argues “The Internet is an extraordinary 
tool that has made communications far faster and eas-
ier...but its utility in reaching across barriers and biding 
people to on another—the core hard work of public di-
plomacy—remains feeble and limited” (p. 92). To ex-
perts like Snyder, figures about Twitter followers, Fa-
cebook likes and Internet traffic give little information 
about what is most important for national influence. To 
cement his argument, he notes that President Obama 
noted that he has less Facebook friends than Sponge 
Bob. This does not deny the possible benefits of social 
media for national influence. Snyder (2013) calls atten-
tion to the fact that social media platforms facilitate in-
formation sharing.  
Still, while new media and social media are fashion-
able, most people in most countries are more likely to 
obtain their political information from old media like 
TV. A 2015 Nielsen report on media usage by in the 
world14 indicates that 76% of Internet users like being 
connected anywhere, anytime, as well as 24/7 connec-
tivity (Nielsen, 2015). TV remains popular and online 
users appear to enjoy using social media to discuss 
with others what they have viewed on TV (Nielsen, 
2015). Apparently, we are in a multiple-screen era as 
47% of the respondents said that they are engaged in 
social media as they watch TV. As for TV itself, the 
                                                          
14 This study used a sample of 300,000 online users in 60 coun-
tries. Retrieved from http://www.nielsen.com/content/ 
dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2015-reports/total-
audience-report-q1-2015.pdf 
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study shows that most respondents prefer television 
sets rather than other devices for viewing video pro-
gramming.  
New interactive roles for international broadcasting 
are visible the data regarding new media ecologies. 
Online media like social media can be used to reinforce 
traditional media transmission. As Snyder (2013) ob-
serves “social media, the Internet, and traditional me-
dia all reinforce each other” (p. 96). As journalists look 
to new media for topics and stories, an increasing 
amount of user-generated content can enter old media 
agenda-setting processes. Also what is covered in old 
media can diffuse into social media discussions and 
debates. Caution of course, is in order, one realizes 
that only ⅓ of the world’s population is actively using 
the Internet (Snyder, 2013).  
8.7. Applying Network Theory to International 
Broadcasting  
Much of what is written about the political uses of new 
media and social media is anecdotal, backed by little 
systematic empirical analysis, and often devoid of use-
ful theoretical reasoning. For this reason, we offer 
some basic principles from network theory that can of-
fer a more sophisticated approach to examining inter-
national broadcasting roles in new media ecologies. 
Some scholars have noted the disconnect between na-
tional influence theorists and practitioners. Pamment 
(2013), for example, observes “Whereas theorists of 
the new PD have tended to point to the normative po-
tential of dialogical and participatory PD, practitioners 
tend to be motivated by short-term self-interest, and 
adopt new PD communization models only when it 
suits them” (p. 127).  
Listing new connection technologies like 
smartphones and chat apps use for political communi-
cation is not theory, nor is it science. Inferring persua-
sion effects from simple exposure to messages has long 
been exposed in communication studies as fallacious 
pursuit. Skeptical musings about social media activism 
by Malcolm Gladwell or Utopian musings by Clay Shirky 
are interesting, but not explanatory. In contrast, net-
work theory offers specific principles of communica-
tion complexity and organization that bring to focus 
the role of international broadcasting within systems of 
information flow and social interactions. Despite dif-
ferences in conclusions about the exact political effects 
of new media and social media, there is general 
agreement that these new technologies provide new 
and emerging forms creating and sharing information 
as well as connecting to others (Seo, 2013). 
There is nothing extraordinary about online infor-
mation usage, but online social relationship formation 
across various national and political boundaries opens 
up opportunities that may involve political networks 
that share political viewpoints including some that dis-
course violence and encourage democracy. To under-
stand more about how social media are associated 
with behaviors related to democracy, more research is 
needed about what activities and collaborations are 
occurring with social media in relation to building or 
fortifying democracies. Of course, participation is im-
portant but participation can be democratic or undem-
ocratic. Topics like Public Diplomacy 2.0 need much 
more empirical and theoretical analysis. The basic prin-
ciple of networking and relationships is that people use 
networks for long-term connections and mutual mes-
sage exchange. Important aspects of social networks 
that make them work well to meeting their relational 
goals are trust, positivity, commitment, and others 
(Seo, 2013). International broadcasting can enter the 
complexity of new media systems and ecologies by in-
terconnecting with other channels, both old and new.  
Communication networks are complex systems. 
They cannot be explained by studying single nodes or 
components. Understanding how a network works re-
quired knowledge of the various types of interactivity 
in the network (Caldarelli & Catanzaro, 2012). Some 
parts of a network, such as the international broadcast-
ing component of a media network, can grow in rela-
tion to design while others such local social and smaller-
media networks may growth through unplanned self-
organizing processes. Network theory applied to our 
model can help to identify where the dynamics of net-
work influence emerge in complex systems of multiple 
channels and dual purposes (influence, relationships).  
One of the most useful findings in network theory 
research is that of preferential attachment. Preferen-
tial attachment refers to new nodes in a network (peo-
ple in a human network) seeking to link to older nodes 
with lots of network connectivity (Caldarelli & Catanza-
ro, 2012). The older nodes that keep attracting more 
and new nodes become what are known as hubs (Cal-
darelli & Catanzaro, 2012). For old or new media, the 
more visibility, the more new links that are likely. Soci-
ologists once found that women rated a man in a pic-
ture higher when he was surrounded by many other 
women than when he was alone in the photo. This is 
an example of the preferential attachment principle 
(Caldarelli & Catanzaro, 2012).  
Research on political communication done online 
indicates that people tend to sort themselves into pre-
ferred networks. One study, for example, showed that 
users of Democratic and Republican blogs have few 
connections to each other across party lines (Caldarelli 
& Catanzaro, 2012). In taking advantage of network 
study findings, professionals working with international 
broadcasting may be able to take advantage of what is 
called social spreading, the tendency of people to mim-
ic the behaviors of their social contacts (Caldarelli & 
Catanzaro, 2012). Indeed, if smoking and obesity are 
increased by social networking, it may be expected that 
political ideas can be as well.  
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9. Conclusions 
When public diplomacy rests on vague notions of soft 
power and cultural networking, key issues of power, 
dominance, and manipulation, which affects worldviews 
of our nation, are continuously glossed or missed. Said 
differently, appeals to soft power to build more posi-
tive American images may be futile when strong nega-
tive images are being formed in relation to American 
use of hard power occurring at the same time. Howev-
er, this does not mean that soft power obviates the use 
of hard power, but rather that a dialectic and complex 
approach to power, communication, and security must 
guide various forms of strategic influence, including in-
ternational broadcasting.  
Today's communication ecology constitutes what 
some call a global information sphere or a global com-
munication system. What is done with international 
broadcasting in this system is not simply a matter of 
technological challenges, but also challenges of pur-
poses and goals and scholars continue to question how 
national influence (including public diplomacy) serves 
national interests and national security concerns. The 
argument presented here attempts to develop a model 
linking strategic communication, public diplomacy, and 
other forms of national influence including strategic in-
fluence. The presented model of strategic influence 
builds in propositions about the need for both assertive 
and challenging communication and globally engaging 
networking and shows how international broadcasting 
can be part of this coordinated effort. Combining or 
coordinating strategic influence with cultural network-
ing can bring out an alternative to soft diplomacy/soft 
power and hard diplomacy/hard power dichotomies, 
and instead offer the alternative of smart power cou-
pled with smart diplomacy. Smart diplomacy uses both 
strategic influence and networking to serve national 
security goals as well as goals of international coopera-
tion and global engagement.  
The analysis and model construction presented 
here makes four important contributions to the study 
and development of national influence efforts. First, 
we provide some ways of bringing together two do-
mains of national influence that are artificially separat-
ed—strategic influence and cultural networking. Sec-
ond, we use communication theory to produce a new 
unified model of national influence. Third, we offer the 
concept of “smart diplomacy” as an analogue to smart 
power. Fourth, we apply network theory to those as-
pect of national influence that increasingly involve 
networking.  
As all research projects have limitations, we 
acknowledge two that appear in our work thus far. 
First, we have done mainly historical and meta-
theoretical analysis with few empirical data sets to 
support our claims. Second, we have not yet cracked 
the code of how to stop the endless flow of terminolo-
gy struggles in the study of SC and PD. Future research 
should build more on process and less on terminology. 
Yet determining which process is most important at 
any point in time will still be debatable. 
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